Now it's 'blackmail' politics

The Japan Times: Monday, December 6, 1993

By REI SHIRATORI
Special to The Japan Times

      A hundred days have passed since the birth of the Hosokawa coalition government, the political reform package of bills has been approved by the Lower House, and as the government's style of policymaking becomes clear, so do its problems.
     The Hosokawa government is pressing for reform of the electoral system to make political parties and policy central in an election. Yet the people cannot trust the political parties in relation to policy. The parties making up the coalition created a situation in which an election has lost much of its meaning as an occasion for voters to make their policy preferences clear.
     An extreme example is the Social Democratic Party of Japan, which resolutely opposed adoption of the single seat constituency system until the general elections in July. It also told the public that it was against the combination of single seat constituencies and proportional representation proposed by the Hosokawa Cabinet. The SDPJ said that such a mixed system would destroy the very base of parliamentary democracy in Japan.
     Yet the party is now playing a central role for the introduction of the single seat constituency system. Former SDPJ Chairman Sadao Yamahana is state minister in charge of political reform in the coalition Cabinet and former Vice Chairman Kanju Sato is home affairs minister. Both are in charge of electoral system reform. The SDPJ made a complete turnaround with respect to political reform (electoral system reform) after joining the coalition government.
     Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa himself demonstrated a policy change in the course of discussing the political reform legislative package. In forming his coalition Cabinet, the prime minister said political reform was its primary task. He made an acceptance of the combination of a single seat constituency system and proportional representation (250 seats each) a condition for the various parties to join the coalition government, He told the public a "basic agreement" had been reached. But he changed its substance overnight as the situation changed.
     What can the voters believe when election time comes around? What policies and parties should they choose? If the Hosokawa coalition continues to conduct political steering in this manner, policymaking will be primarily aimed at maintaining the coalition government, regardless of the electoral system adopted, and the public will look on helplessly from afar. The voters will no longer believe the political parties and their public pledges. Whatever electoral system is finally adopted, an election should not become an occasion when the voters cannot choose the parties and policies they believe are right.
     The liberal Democratic government for years conducted money-tainted "corrupt politics." It can be said that the Hosokawa coalition government, notwithstanding the prime minister's great personal popularity, is fostering "delinquent politics" as seen in the light of political ethics.
     It also seems that the practice of "blackmail politics" is growing under the Hosokawa coalition. Policymaking is being greatly affected by a coalition party indirectly threatening to bolt the coalition government and destroy the government if its views are not accepted and adopted. The effect of this style is already evident in regard to the questioning of Diet members suspected of involvement in bribery by the big construction companies. The effect may also appear with respect to the consumption tax and agricultural problems.
     The Hosokawa coalition government has raised high the banner of political reform from its birth. Yet it has not summoned for Diet questioning Ichiro Ozawa of Shinseito (Japan Renewal Party), who has admitted accepting a part of the money handed out by the large construction firms, many of whose executives have been arrested. These executives, too, have not been asked to testify in the Diet. Why? Because Shinseito is threatening the coalition Cabinet with blackmail politics.
In both the Lockheed and Recruit scandals, the Liberal Democratic Party, holding a majority in the Lower House, summoned Diet members and other related people to testify as witnesses in the Diet. It should be noted that the Hosokawa coalition government, which claims political reform is its primary task, does not act in a similar manner.
     Blackmail politics arose from the fact that Hosokawa became prime minister by excluding the heads of the big SDPJ and Shinseito when his own Japan New Party is a smaller party. While he had no malicious intent, he used his position as head of a minority party with a deciding vote to demand that the bigger parties accept the idea of 250 seats for single-seat constituencies and 250 seats for proportional representation as a condition for participating in the coalition government. The other parties imitated this blackmail politics style.
     The smaller parties can more effectively try this. Look at the SDPJ, the largest force in the coalition, whose effort, failed in the final phase of the political reform package. The biggest effect of blackmail politics is that the views of the people are not accurately reflected in policymaking because it is used most adroitly by the smaller parties.
     Ozawa may resort to this type of political intimidation on the question of raising the consumption at rate. Prime Minister Hosokawa and the SDPJ may similarly intimidate each other on the rice import liberalization question, with the prime minister for it and the SDPJ against. If this grandstand-type of black mail politics continues, consistency of policy will be lost and there will be no guarantee that the policy finally adopted is the most rational and best choice.
     Third, the essentially provisional nature of the Hosokawa coalition government and the permanent character of the problems it is trying to resolve contradict each other. The Hosokawa government was born in August as a provisional Cabinet whose main job was to realize political reform and put an end to the money politics practiced for so long by its predecessor, the Liberal Democratic regime. The coalition was formed by seven parties and one Diet group that closed ranks merely for the purpose of bringing to an end the long Liberal Democratic rule. Not once during the campaigning for the July general elections did they hold policy consultations among themselves. They drew up an "agreement" and a "memorandum" for the creation of the coalition. It can be said that the Hosokawa Cabinet accomplished half of its task by toppling the Liberal Democratic Party from power.
     While it started as a sort of provisional government, however, the Hosokawa Cabinet faces problems that certainly are not provisional in character. They include rice import liberalization in the Uruguay Round of international trade talks, the settlement of which will have a lasting effect on Japanese agriculture. In their "memorandum" the coalition partners said they are opposed to rice tariffication with no exceptions. If they make a different decision they will not only be betraying the people but binding the future of Japanese agriculture as well.
     Ozawa, who plays a central role in the Hosokawa cabinet's policymaking, and Prime Minister Hosokawa are now talking about simplifying and reducing income tax rates and raising the consumption tax rate. These are matters that the public and the parties making up the coalition did not imagine would be raised at the time the coalition was born. They could fundamentally alter the Japanese economic and financial systems. The people certainly did not give the seven parties and one Diet group _ which later formed the coalition _ a free hand in policy matters such as the consumption tax rate issue that were not discussed at all during the election campaign.
     Ozawa, who as noted plays a key role in the coalition government's policymaking, holds no official position in the government. This is not a desirable situation, as Ozawa will not be able to assume responsibility in the event a government measure fails or produces an undesirable effect. A policy is irresponsible when one of its key formulators cannot be held responsible because he holds no official position.
     How the coalition government will steer the ship of state in the period ahead is an even more important matter than which electoral system is ultimately adopted.

     Rei Shiratori is dean of the School of Political Science and Economic of Tokai University.