The July 18 lower house election brought an end to the Liberal Democratic Party's single-party rule. It was
also touted as another step toward "politician reform." But does the outcome in fact represent a historical turning point for Japanese
politics? The fall of Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa's administration was in actuality the culmination of a leadership struggle between the two factions
that formed after split of the powerful faction once controlled by former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita. One of the two groups is led by Tsutomu Hata,
who later left the LDP with his followers to form the breakaway party Shinseito, and the other is headed by Keizo Obuchi
Power struggle
A closer look into developments shows that there appears to be no difference at all in policy between Hata's group and the
LDP leadership except for details on electoral reform.
I recall the words of a contemporary American political scientist who said that politicians are people who have the knack of
transforming private motives into public goals. This election was born from intrafactional strife- a private cause for those involved. But during the
campaign, many politicians focused attention on what appeared to be a public goal - putting an end to the LDP's 38-year rule. This background also led
to the emergence of the new conservative parties.
It is indeed true that the existing political parties were facing a period of gridlock. With a persistent recession replacing
the boom days of the 1980s' the LDP has been unable to present a new vision to replace economic growth. The demise of communism, meanwhile, deprived the
party of its familiar tactic of generation public fear of the communist menace.
The end of the Cold War has also left the Social Democratic Party of Japan, the largest opposition party, ideologically adrift.
At the same time, voters are becoming more independent in the way they cast their ballots. The LDP can no longer rely on
corporate urging to encourage employees to vote for the ruling party. And the SDP can no longer depend so heavily on the labor unions to get the vote
out.
Voters are finding it increasingly difficult to select one party for its long-term policies. One voter may be interested in
environmental protection and concerned about global warming, even though he himself owns a car. Another may be hoping for fatter pension and welfare
benefits as the population ages, but is opposed to any tax increases during this prolonged recession.
Voter decisions are thus likely to be influenced by issues that concern them most at the time of an election.
Central policy issues in the latest election were the transfer of some authority from the central to local governments and
termination of the LDP's sole grip on power. What the latter meant for voters was not simply ending the LDP's dominance but scrapping the entire
political framework, including other conventional parties.
In this regard, the primary beneficiary was the Japan New Party, which went from no seats in the Lower House to 35. Two other
parties formed by LDP renegades - Shinseito and Sakigake - also significantly increased their Diet presence.
The LDP actually gained one seat in the Lower House. This reality good outcome can be attribute to its tactic of generating
public concern about whether the non-LDP forces would be able to form a coalition government. The Social Democratic hold substantially different views
from the other opposition parties on the Constitution and United Nations peacekeeping operations. On electoral reform, Shinseito favors single-seat
constituencies, while the SDP is for proportional representation.
The LDP's clever campaign tactic has nearly destroyed hopes for a coalition government by non-LDP forces. It also succeeded in
regaining the confidence of the public by going from the defensive to the offensive during the campaign.
Fatal opportunism
The SDP's humiliating defeat stemmed not only from a lack of alternatives to socialism but also from the opportunistic
manner in which it handled the situation in the run-up to the election.
The Social Democrats submitted a censure motion against Miyazawa three days before the end of the previous Diet session. When
the campaign got under way, and despite being the largest opposition party by far, SDP leaders readily endorsed a proposal to from a coalition
government headed by Shinseito's Hata. They even said they would inherit LDP policies if a coalition were formed, ignoring the almost unbridgeable gap
in policy between themselves and the ruling conservatives.
The SDP thereby abandoned its responsibility of presenting policy options different from those of the ruling party and of
showing the public that there was an alternative. Having renounced this responsibility, the SDP perhaps deserved its crushing rejection by the voters.
Also playing a role in the SDP's election debacle was Akira Yamaguchi, president of Rengo, the nation's largest trade union. In
addition to being preoccupied with electoral reform, Yamagishi has adopted a more accommodating stance toward business leaders as a result of the
recession. The stubborn downturn has forced many corporations to weaken their lifetime employment pledges and streamline operations.
Confidence undermined
Instead of speaking out against Yamagishi's odd stance, SDP leaders remained silent. This helped to undermine the confidence
of union members in Rengo itself as well as in the SDP.
The election resulted in a situation in which there is one major party and eight smaller ones. Where does this outcome lead us?
The likeliest direction is toward a minority government led by the LDP.
The possibility of non-LDP forces forming a coalition is slim indeed. The major task expected of such a coalition is electoral
reform - an issue on which it is extremely difficult for the SDP and Shinseito to reach agreement.
Even if a forced accord is struck between the two, the SDP would face internal strife and eventually split. Under the current
multiparty arrangement, the introduction of single-seat constituencies as proposed by Shinseito does not seem so meaningful.
A non-LDP coalition government, if it does emerge, will exist only to end the long-lived one-party dominance of LDP government.
In that case, Morihiro Hosokawa of the Japan New Party, rather than Shinseito's Tsutomu Hata, is expected to become prime minister, only to leave office
in about six to 12 months.
If the LDP forms a minority government, it would have to enact an anticorruption law as early as possible and work out a
generous simulative budget LDP could convince voters of the benefits of stable government and could even call another general election in December.
Failing that, it could stage a simultaneous election for both houses in 1996.
Should the LDP be unable to recover a parliamentary majority in one of those elections or form a stable coalition government,
Japanese politics will enter a long period of flux.
Rei Shiratori is a professor of politics at Tokai University.
